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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
usual legal sense, was the solution of another court, which held that knowl-
edge by one defendant of the other's activity was sufficient to attach entire
liability where the defendants' separate acts had caused the plaintiff what
the court considered a single injury.13 Another court sought to make a
distinction between "direct" and "consequential" injury the solution to
the problem of whether each defendant was liable for the entire harm in a
case in which there was an interval of time between the defendants' inde-
pendent acts and the injury to the plaintiff.14
The proposed solutions of the above cases have proved abortive. The
innovations have remained law only in the jurisdictions where the cases
were decided. It seems that the Texas court in the principal case has ar-
rived at the best solution by finding entire liability and allowing procedural
joinder of the defendants.
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FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-APPORTIONMENT4
Approximately three-fourths of the intestate's gross estate consisted of
probate assets.' The remainder constituted the corpus of a trust which was
created by the decedent during her lifetime and which was not subject to
probate administration.2 The admimstrator paid the federal estate tax out
of the probate assets and then sought to recover from the trustee an amount
equal to the trust's proportionate share of the tax. The Ohio Supreme
Court, in reversing the lower courts, held3 that the burden of the federal
estate tax should be apportioned between the probate and the non-probate
assets.4
The court cited with approval the case of Miller v. Hammond,5 which
held that a surviving spouse, electing to take against her deceased spouse's
""If a party deliberately places himself in opposition to the entire community by
performing an act which, in combination with the independent wrongful acts of
others, violates an express statute and creates a public nuisance, he is not in a posi-
tion to assert that he should be held responsible to individuals specially damaged
for only the actual loss he alone has occasioned them." West Muncie Strawboard
Co. v. Slack, 164 Ind. 21, 25, 72 N.E. 879, 880 (1904), severely criticized in City
of Mansfield v. Bristor, 76 Ohio St. 270, 81 N.E. 631 (1907).
" "If parties, although acting independently, know or have.reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that their independent acts, combining with the independent acts of others, will
create a result that will become a nuisance, and they do so causing damage, they be-
come as it were, joint wrongdoers ab smto Where all have knowledge of
the independent acts that create the result and continue the independent acts with
knowledge, this ipso facto creates a concert of action and makes a common design or
purpose." Moses v. Town of Morganton, 192 N.C. 102, 106, 133 S.E. 421, 423
(1926)
" The court held that here the injury was "consequential" because the "subject of the
injury was different from that upon which the wrongful acts were directly inflicted."
Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke Co. 85 WVa. 595, 600, 102 S.E. 265, 267 (1920)
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will, is entitled to an estate tax marital deduction and, therefore, her statu-
tory share should not have to pay a part of the federal estate tax when her
share does not exceed the amount permitted for the marital deduction.
Both the principal case and the Miller case cite Industrtal Trust Co. V. Bud-
long,8 a case similar on its facts to the principal case except that the deceased
died testate. The Industnau Trust case also held for apportionment
As a result of these recent decisions, the Ohio rule as to apportionment
of federal estate tax can be summarized as follows: Where there are probate
and non-probate assets, the court will allow apportionment in the case of
intestacy," and will probably allow apportionment in the case of testacy.9
Where there are only probate assets, the court has held against apportion-
ment and has imposed the entire tax upon the residuary estate in the case
of one who dies testate.'0 What the court will do in a case where the de-
cedent dies intestate with only probate assets is speculative.
ROBERT PREsTON
* This supplements Note, Apportionmeent of Federal Estate Tax, 3 WESTERN RE-
sERvE L REv. 164 (1951).
'Those assets which are subject to probate administration. See 3 WESTERN RE-
saEv L REv. 164 (1951).
'Although not subject to probate administration, the amount of the trust was in-
cluded in the gross estate by virtue of § 811 (d) of the Internal Revenue Code.
'McDougall, Adm'r. v. Central National Bank, 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441,
rehearing denied, 25 Ohio Bar 181 (1952).
'In the absence of statute the question of where the burden of the tax will fall is a
matter of the decedents intention, either expressed or implied, and where no contrary
intention can be found then an equitable apportionment of the tax should follow.
There was no expressed intention in the principal case. See 3 WEsTERN RE SERvE
L REv. 164 (1951).
'156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E.2d 9 (1952), decided several weeks earlier by the
same court.
"76 A.2d 600 (R.I. 1951).
"The court in both the principal case and the Miller case, speaking of the Industrial
Trust case, said: "That holding, in our opinion, discloses a proper application of
equitable principles for the purpose of preventing injustice to some heirs and un-
justified windfalls to others."
"McDougall, Adm'r. v. Central National Bank, 157 Ohio St 45, 104 N.E.2d 441,
rehearing dented, 25 Ohio Bar 181 (1952).
'This follows from the express approval of the Industrtal Trust case both in the
principal case and in the Miller case.
': Y.C.A. v. Davis, 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N.E. 114 (1922), affd, 264 U.S. 47,
44 Sup. Ct. 291 (1924).
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